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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTH AMENDMENT - A WITNESS
MAY NOT INVOKE THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
BEFORE THE GRAND JURY OR AS A BASIS FOR REFUSING TO ANSWER
QUESTIONS BASED ON EVIDENCE SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF HIS FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS.
United States v. Calandra (U.S. 1974)
In December, 1970, federal agents, as part of their investigation of
illegal gambling, obtained a warrant authorizing a search of respondent's
place of business in order to find and seize gambling records and para-
phernalia. After executing the warrant, the agents conducted a thorough
search that failed to uncover any gambling paraphernalia. However, an
agent did discover, among some promissory notes, a card indicating that
a known victim of loansharking was making payments to respondent.
Concluding that it was a loansharking record and as such would be
pertinent to the loansharking investigation then being conducted by the
United State's Attorney's Office, the agent seized the card.1
A short time later, a special federal grand jury was convened to in-
vestigate loansharking activities and respondent was subpoenaed to answer
the grand jury's questions based upon the evidence seized during the
search. He appeared but invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. 2
The hearing in response to a government motion to grant transactional
immunity8 was postponed to allow respondent to prepare a motion pursuant
to rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure4 for the sup-
pression and return of the evidence seized in the search.,
At a hearing upon this motion, the respondent stipulated that he would
refuse to answer any question based on the seized materials.6 The district
1. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1974).
2. Id.
3. Transactional immunity shields an immunized witness from a future criminal
prosecution related to the matter for which immunity was granted. Comment, Practical
Problems in the Wake of Kastigar, 19 ViLL. L. REv. 470 (1973). Transactional im-
munity is broader than use/derivative use immunity which only prohibits use and
derivative use of testimony against an immunized witness. Id. at 473-77.
4. The rule provides in pertinent part:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district
court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the
property on the ground that he is entitled to lawful possession of the property
which was illegally seized.
FE. R. CRIm. P. 41(e).
5. 414 U.S. at 341.
6. In re Calandra, 332 F. Supp. 737, 738 (W.D. Ohio 1971).
(645)
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court ruled that the evidence should be suppressed, and that respondent need
not answer any of the grand jury's questions based upon that evidence.
7
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the
suppression motion was properly entertained and the exclusionary rule
properly invoked.
8
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the speculative and minimal
increase in the deterrence of police misconduct to be obtained by extending
the protection of the exclusionary rule to grand jury witnesses was out-
weighed by the substantial impediment it would pose to the important role
of the grand jury in the criminal justice system, and that the same rationale
prevented exclusion of the fruits of the illegal search, the grand jury
questions. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
That the grand jury is a significant part of the criminal justice system
is demonstrated by the fact that the Constitution requires that a federal
trial for certain crimes be based upon a grand jury indictment. 9 This is
because of the grand jury's traditional functions of determining the existence
of probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and protecting
citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.'" While broad investi-
gatory and indicting powers are required by these functions,1' such powers
are not absolute. Hence, the courts continue to exercise control over the
grand jury.
1 2
The rule that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment is
inadmissible against the person whose rights have been violated - the
exclusionary rule - was articulated for the federal system in Weeks v.
7. Id. at 746. The government did not seek review of the lower court's holding
that the search was unlawful or of the order to return the seized property. 414 U.S.
at 342 n.2.
8. United States v. Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1972). The district court's
ruling that the warrant and the search were invalid was affirmed. Id. at 1226 n.5.
9. The requirement is contained in the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution, which provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be held to answer for
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. 414 U.S. at 343.
11. The investigating power of a grand jury is broad so that it can adequately
discharge its responsibility. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668 (1972). Citizens
have an obligation to appear before the grand jury and testify. United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1973). The government can compel testimony, even in
the face of a claimed fifth amendment privilege if immunity from prosecution co-
extensive with that privilege is granted. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443,
466 (1972). Lastly, a witness cannot raise the objections of incompetency or ir-
relevancy or try to set limits upon the grand jury's investigation. Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). See also, United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323,
331 (1950) ; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932).
The breadth of the indicting power is demonstrated by the fact that a facially
valid indictment is impervious to attack by a criminal defendant. Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956). See also United States v. Lawn, 355 U.S. 339, 349
(1958) ; Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 247 (1910).
12. The Supreme Court has stated that:
A grand jury is clothed with great independence in many areas but it
remains an appendage of the court, powerless to perform its investigative function
without the court's aid ....
Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 and 17(c).
See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668, 700 (1972); id. at 709 (Powell,
J., concurring).
2
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United States.' The rule also deprives the government of the use as
evidence at trial of the "fruits" of the illegal search, evidence obtained
derivatively from the government's initial unconstitutional action.14 The
primary justification for the rule is that it is the best method for effective
protection of fourth amendment rights because it deters police misconduct
by discouraging future violations of rights.15 Additionally, the rule is
grounded in the desire to preserve judicial integrity by removing the
implied judicial approval of illegality which would exist if the evidence
were admissible.' 6 While this rule remains the primary method of enforcing
fourth amendment rights, case law now provides a federal damages remedy
for the victims of a violation of fourth amendment rights.'
7
However, in order to invoke the exclusionary rule in a criminal pro-
ceeding, one must be a proper party to do so. The doctrine of the standing
to assert fourth amendment rights has developed as the basic procedural
limitation on a person's ability to use the rule.18 The Supreme Court's
response to the vicarious assertion of constitutional rights has been to
13. 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). The exclusionary rule was extended through the
fourteenth amendment to bar the use of illegally seized evidence in state courts in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). The Supreme Court refused to make the
prohibition retroactive in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 640 (1965).
14. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963). This prohibition
is not an absolute bar. When evidence seized in an illegal search is no longer "fruit of
the poisonous tree" because it has such an attenuated causal connection with the initial
illegality as to be "purged of the primary taint," it becomes admissible despite the
illegal search. Id. at 487-88.
15. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). See Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 217 (1960). For a general discussion of the justifications for tile exclusionary
rule, see Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHi.
L. REv. 665, 668 (1970).
16. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 392-93 (1914). This concept was first articulated in Weeks, wherein the Court
stated that "[t]o sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision
a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution,
intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action." Id. at 394.
Commentators have downgraded the importance of this concept. See Oaks, supra
note 15, at 669. However, it is submitted that the Court should attempt to preserve
judicial integrity, at the very least in cases where federal courts are involved, because
the Supreme Court controls the practices of the federal courts and sets the tone
for their dispensing of justice. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41
(1943).
17. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Commentators
have pointed out that tort remedies have been ineffective. See, e.g., Spiotto, Search
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives,
2 J. LEGAL STUDEs 243, 269-72 (1973); Oaks, supra note 15, at 674. Before
Bivens was decided, courts viewed damages as an ineffective remedy. See, e.g.,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-653 (1961); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 202
(4th Cir. 1966).
While there has been no final verdict in Bivens, the Second Circuit held that
an agent has established a valid defense to a damages claim if he proves that he
acted in good faith with a reasonable belief in the validity of the arrest and search.
The agent must also show a reasonable belief in the necessity for carrying out the
arrest and search in that way. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d
1339, 1341 (2nd Cir. 1972).
18. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969).
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hold that only the victim of the invasion of privacy has standing to
invoke the exclusionary rule.'
Supreme Court cases involving the application of fourth amendment
rights to grand jury proceedings have been limited in number to two.
In Hale v. Henkel,20 the Court held that a subpoena duces tecum was an
unreasonable search and seizure if its demands were too broad. 2' In the
other case, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,2 2 the Court reversed
a contempt conviction based upon a refusal to produce illegally seized
evidence requested by a grand jury after the evidence had been ordered
returned to the victims of the search.
23
In the instant case, Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, first
determined that a grand jury hearing is not an adversary determination of
guilt or innocence, but only an investigation into the probable existence
of criminal conduct and, as such, should be unhampered by the procedural
restraints attendant a trial.24 Because society's interests are best served
by a thorough investigation, he wrote, a witness must surrender his interest
in privacy and testify when called. 25 However, Justice Powell did not
view the grand jury's power as unlimited, but rather as subject to court
control, at least in those cases where judicial supervision could prevent a
wrong.
2 6
The Court then turned specifically to the exclusionary rule. It con-
cluded that "the rule is a judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather
than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."' 27 Furthermore,
the Court stated that the rule was used only in instances where its remedial
objectives were thought to be most efficaciously served, as evidenced by the
existence of the requirement that only the victim of the wrong had standing
to invoke the exclusionary rule.
2 8
Next, the Court balanced the potential injury to the historic role of
the grand jury against the potential benefits of the application of the
exclusionary rule in the grand jury context. The potential impediment to
the grand jury was found to be grave since invocation of the exclusionary
rule would bring up issues formerly reserved for trial, interfering with
grand jury efficiency.2 9 Due to the asserted importance of the grand jury,
19. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968) ; Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). See White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and
Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 333, 346-47 (1970).
20. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
21. Id. at 76.
22. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
23. Id. at 392.
24. 414 U.S. at 343-44.
25. Id. at 345, citing Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
26. 414 U.S. at 346.
27. Id. at 348 (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 349. The Court accorded some weight to the two and one-half years
involved in this appeal. Id. at n.7.
Delay, however, is not a unitary concept: and it is necessary to distinguish
avoidable delay from the time necessary for a proper proceeding. The lower court
[VOL. 19
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it was feared that such delay could be "fatal to the enforcement of the
criminal law."30 In contrast, the advantages derived from the exclusionary
rule were thought to be uncertain since the only police actions which would
be deterred would be illegal investigations consciously directed towards
discovery of evidence solely for use in grand jury investigations.31 This
uncertainty was compounded by the fact that any incentive to disregard
the fourth amendment solely to obtain an indictment was negated by the
inadmissibility of the evidence at the trial of the search's victim, since a
prosecutor would be loathe to seek an indictment where the admissible
evidence would not support a conviction. 2 These same considerations
were found to limit the deterrent effect of permitting the witness to refuse
to answer grand jury questions on the ground that they were the fruits
of the illegal search. Therefore, the known burden was found to outweigh
the unproven gain and the witness was prohibited from either excluding the
illegally seized evidence or refusing to answer the grand jury's questions.."
It is submitted that the Court's balancing of the detriments and ad-
vantages was inaccurate because it was based upon an erroneous view of
the grand jury's present function and incorrectly estimated the degree of
deterrence to police misconduct afforded by the exclusionary rule. More-
over, as Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissenting opinion,3 4 the
majority both downgraded the importance of the preservation of judicial
integrity as a foundation of the exclusionary rule and dealt inadequately
with precedent.
The Court premised its holding on the possibly unrealistic model of
the grand jury as having broad powers both to investigate crime and to
serve as a strong buffer between the state and its citizens.3 5 However, a
recent article dealing specifically with the federal grand jury surveyed the
grand jury's relationship with both witnesses and defendants and con-
cluded that present policies surrounding the grand jury no longer serve a
useful purpose because of radically changed circumstances: "(I]t is no
longer a group of peers sitting to protect citizens; instead, it is an arm
made this distinction and found that the suppression hearing was necessary to pre-
serve respondent's rights. 332 F. Supp. at 741. The Supreme Court did not make
the same distinction. Apparently it viewed the grand jury proceeding as being of
such value as to make any delay improper.
30. 414 U.S. at 350.
31. Id. It should be observed that the evidence respondent sought to suppress
had been seized because of a federal investigation. See text accompanying note 1
supra. The district court felt that the real object of this search was loansharking
evidence, a view that supports the proposition that this search had been conducted to
gather evidence for a grand jury. See 332 F. Supp. at 746.
32, 414 U.S. at 351.
33. Id. at 353-55.
34. Id. at 355-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.
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of the state more powerful than ever before, serving the ends of the
prosecution. "8 6
If the grand jury no longer performs both its investigative and pro-
tective functions, the Court's model of the grand jury was therefore
erroneous and consequently, its conclusion that sanctioning the use of the
exclusionary rule would damage this important part of the criminal justice
system, is questionable. Assuming arguendo that grand juries do investi-
gate, the assumption that individuals are protected by the grand jury is one
apparently without empirical basis, which induced the Court to deny a
remedy that would have given effect to the grand jury witness' constitutional
rights. It is submitted that the Court viewed the grand jury in an un-
realistically favorable light.
Even if the Court perceived itself as somehow bound by the historical,
theoretical model of the grand jury, it nevertheless ignored the deterrent
created by the application of the exclusionary rule to grand jury investi-
gations. In a criminal trial, the prosecutor's lack of control over past police
actions means he can only attempt to mitigate the consequences of police
misconduct. A grand jury investigation, on the other hand, is one situation
in which the prosecutor controls the present conduct of police acting as
investigators. Therefore, if the exclusionary rule could be invoked by
grand jury witnesses, the prosecutor would be motivated to prevent mis-
conduct by police because suppression of illegally seized evidence would
endanger potential indictments.87
The Court found some deterrent to the use of illegally seized evidence
before a grand jury in the inadmissibility of such evidence at the trial of
the search victim.8 8 However, the concept of standing to invoke the
exclusionary rule makes this deterrent chimerical when, for example, the
illegally seized evidence is used to obtain indictments against those who
lack standing to protest fourth amendment violations at trial. In that
36. Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 1, 35 (1972). For a general
summary of the arguments for and against the grand jury see S. KADIsN & M.
PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1049 (2d ed. 1969).
An early study of the grand jury concluded that, more often than not, the
grand jury only rubber-stamped the actions of the prosecutor and allowed him to
escape responsibility for the bringing of criminal charges. Morse, A Survey of the
Grand Jury System, Pt. 1I, 10 ORE. L. REV. 295, 363 (1931). A more recent article by
a former prosecutor describes the grand jury as a body dependent upon the prosecutor
- since only he understands the technical and legal aspects of the proceeding - and
as activist in orientation, with little interest in protecting the citizenry from un-
founded criminal charges or safeguarding constitutional rights. The grand jury is
portrayed as being no more than a reviewer of the prosecutor's predigested evidence
and ratifier of his conclusions. Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Super-
government, 51 A.B.A.J. 153, 155 (1965). A federal judge, while urging the abolition
of the grand jury because its use is detrimental to the efficient administration of
criminal justice, reached the same conclusion. See Campbell, Delays in Criminal
Cases, 55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972).
One author has gone further, concluding that the grand jury has become an
administrative agency unchecked by the safeguards applied to other such bodies.
See Shannon, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the People or Administrative Agency
of the Prosecutor?, 2 NEW MExico L. REv. 141, 166-67 (1972).
37. Cf. Oaks, supra note 15, at 726.
38. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
[VOL. 19
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situation, prohibiting the use of the exclusionary rule by grand jury wit-
nesses allows a prosecutor to obtain the benefits of illegal conduct without
having to face the consequences of having evidence declared inadmissible
at trial.3 9
Thus, concentrating on a deterrent that was questionable and ignoring
the presence of the strong deterrent potential in the unique circumstance
of close police-prosecutor cooperation in a grand jury investigation, the
Court fallaciously found uncertain benefit from the exclusionary rule that
could not overcome the alleged harm to the criminal justice system.
Finally, it is submitted that the Court afforded insufficient weight to
the validity of the exclusionary rule by diminishing the importance of the
preservation of judicial integrity. 40 The problem was summarily dismissed:
"Illegal conduct" is hardly sanctioned ... by declining to make an un-
precedented extension of the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceed-
ings where the rule's objective would not be effectively served .... 41
However, this view ignores the long-recognized practice of not implying
judicial approval of the illegal search. That ethic is hardly served when
illegal evidence is placed before a grand jury subject to a court's super-
vision.42 Exclusion of the evidence certainly would help to preserve judicial
integrity.
In sum, the balance reached by the Court was faulty on two grounds:
It failed to weigh realistically the grand jury's role in the modern criminal
justice system and thereby added artificial legitimacy to this factor. At
the same time, the Court's failure to consider a potential deterrent plus
its ignoring of the concept of judicial integrity meant that potential benefits
of the exclusionary rule, perhaps sufficient to tip the balance, went
unrecognized.
Aside from employing its inaccurate balancing test, the Court also
failed adequately to distinguish while refusing to overrule Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States,43 which seemed to dictate a contrary result.
In that case, while the Silverthornes were in custody, federal agents went
to the Silverthorne Company's offices and seized all available documents
and papers. An application for return of the documents was opposed by
the government because the seizure had led to evidence that was before
the grand jury. Before the district court ordered a return of the documents
and impounded all copies, another indictment was framed and subpoenas
to produce the original documents were served. The district court ordered
compliance with the subpoenas even though it found that the papers had
been seized in violation of the parties' constitutional rights.44 The petitioners'
39. See White, supra note 19, at 351. See also, notes 18-19 and accompanying
text supra.
40. See 414 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See note 16 and accompany-
ing text supra.
41. 414 U.S. at 355 n.11.
42. Id. at 346 n.4.
43. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
44. Id. at 390-91.
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refusal to comply with the subpoenas led to the contempt conviction re-
versed by the Supreme Court.45 The Court stated that its holding in the
Weeks case precluded the direct submission of the papers to the grand
jury46 and, furthermore, that it would not sanction the two-step process
employed against the Silverthornes. Said the Court in an oft-quoted
passage:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence
in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be
used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.
47
The majority in Calandra rejected the dissent's contention that
Silverthorne was controlling 48 and distinguished the instant case on several
grounds. 49 First, it was noted that the Silverthornes could have invoked
the exclusionary rule on the basis of their status as criminal defendants,
while Calandra was not a criminal defendant, thereby having no standing
to invoke the rule.50 Perhaps the Silverthornes could have relied upon
their status as defendants, but there is nothing in that opinion to indicate
such reliance. 51 In addition, the Calandra majority's limitation of standing
in this sense to situations wherein the government seeks to incriminate
5 2
is unjustified because, as the dissent observed, standing was developed to
avoid the danger of vicarious assertion of constitutional rights, a danger
absent when the victim of the illegal search himself seeks to exclude evi-
dence. 53 Lastly, it is unclear why the Silverthornes' status as defendants
under a previous indictment 54 should afford them any special protection
against a grand jury subpoena in a subsequent investigation.55
A second distinction made by the majority rested on its view that the
subpoenas in Silverthorne were attempts to recapture illegally seized evi-
dence for use in a previously authorized criminal prosecution. The "primary
result" of Silverthorne was viewed as one excluding the evidence from the
criminal prosecution only, rather than one also depriving a grand jury
investigation of such information.5" But Silverthorne did not make it clear
that the documents were intended for a criminal prosecution; instead, it
suggests that the documents were for the grand jury. Otherwise, the lan-
guage in Silverthorne to the effect that illegally seized evidence could not
be used before the court "at all" is inexplicable since the inadmissability of
45. Id. at 392.
46. Id. at 391-92.
47. Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
48. 414 U.S. at 361-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 352 n.8.
50. Id.
51. The Silverthorne Court spoke of violations of the parties' rights: no mention
was made of the Silverthornes' status as defendants. See 251 U.S. at 390-92.
52. 414 U.S. at 348.
53. Id. at 365 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 18-19 and accompanying
text supra.
54. 251 U.S. at 390.
55. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
56. 414 U.S. at 352 n.8.
[VOL. 19
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the documents at trial could have been established simply by citing Weeks.57
It therefore appears that both cases involved the presentation of illegally
seized evidence to the grand jury and cannot be distinguished on the basis of
different "primary results.
'58
A final distinction was based upon the Court's finding that prior to the
issuance of the subpoena in Silverthorne there had been a judicial deter-
mination of the illegality of the search which had obviated any need for
a pre-indictment suppression motion requiring the interruption of grand
jury proceedings. 59 However, the prior judicial determination of illegality
in Silverthorne required the return of evidence then before the grand
jury,60 and thus did involve an interruption of grand jury proceedings - a
fact ignored by the Calandra Court.61
The inadequacy of the distinctions drawn by the Court in order to
avoid following Silverthorne makes it appear, as the dissent argued, that
the case was overruled sub silentio to the extent that it has prohibited the
use of illegally seized evidence before the grand jury.62
While in most cases illegally seized evidence can now be considered
by the grand jury, a consideration of illegal wiretaps leads to a contrary
result. While a grand jury witness may not invoke the exclusionary rule
to prevent grand jury questions propounded upon the basis of illegally
seized evidence, he or she may nonetheless successfully invoke a federal
statute that bars the use of information obtained by illegal wiretapping,
63
as a defense to a similar contempt judgment. 64 This contradiction exists
despite the fact that Congress wrote the statute to reflect existing law.65
While Congress' reading of the law is not necessarily correct, at least one
commentator writing prior to the instant decision has agreed that allowing
57. See note 13 and accompanying text supra. There are other indications that
the documents were treated by the Silverthorne Court as having been intended for
the grand jury. The opinion speaks of refusal to obey an order to produce documents
before the grand jury. Id. at 391. The Court also says Weeks had established that
laying papers directly before the grand jury was unwarranted. Id. at 391-92. Lastly,
the Silverthornes later moved to quash the second indictment. They argued that the
Supreme Court had barred the evidence from the grand jury since their motion was
based, in part, on the grand jury's consideration of illegally seized evidence. The
district court granted the motion for that reason. United States v. Silverthorne, 265
F. 859, 862-64 (W.D.N.Y. 1920).
58. However, even under Silverthorne, an independent source, perhaps the loan-
shark victim, could provide the same knowledge as the seized material without the
same problem of admissibility. 251 U.S. at 392. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
59. 414 U.S. at 352 n.8.
60. 251 U.S. at 391. See 414 U.S. at 342 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. See 414 U.S. at 342 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. See 414 U.S. at 362-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. The statute provides in partinent part that:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be re-
ceived in evidence in any . . . proceeding in or before any . . . grand jury
1 . . if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. §2515 (1970).
64. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 47 (1972). The case was decided
on statutory grounds. Id. at 45 n. 5.
65. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1968).
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invocation of the illegal wiretap defense was consistent with existing law
spawned by Silverthorne 66
In not allowing a grand jury witness to invoke the exclusionary rule,
the Court has clearly determined that there is an area of the criminal justice
system wherein the exclusionary rule will not operate even if the witness'
fourth amendment rights have been violated. This fact is most significant
when, as the court of appeals concluded in the instant case, the investigation
involves organized crime.0 7 The Court thus has created a potential in this
type of investigation for permissible violations of the rights of the alleged
lower echelon figures in order to obtain evidence and indictments against
higher-ranking persons. Thus, the prosecutor benefits from illegal conduct
and the victim of an illegal search is left with an uncertain damages remedy
as his sole form of redress.0 8
In addition to giving only very limited relief to grand jury witnesses
for violations of their fourth amendment rights, the Court's holding raises
the question of the future of the exclusionary rule. Any attempt to predict
future decisions is difficult, but it appeared to Mr. Justice Brennan that the
majority was signalling a willingness to abandon the exclusionary rule in
search and seizure cases.0 9 This view is reinforced by Mr. Chief Justice
Burger's well-known dislike of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure
cases, 70 and, in the instant case, by the Court's downgrading of the im-
portance of the exclusionary rule7' and failure to deal adequately with the
concept of judicial integrity.
Perhaps even more significant is the Court's noncommittal attitude
toward the rule's application at trial. Noting that a dispute over the rule's
efficacy existed, the Court nonetheless concluded, "We have no occasion
in the present case to consider the extent of the rule's efficacy in criminal
trials. s7 2 It is at least possible then that a rule which the Court tolerates
only because of its theoretical deterrent effect 78 will be abandoned unless
practical experience clearly demonstrates such deterrence. Additional sup-
port for this rationale could come from those commentators who have been
unable to find a clear empirical foundation demonstrating the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule.
7 4
66. See Boudin, supra note 36, at 11.
67. 465 F.2d at 1226.
68. See note 17 supra.
69. 414 U.S. at 365-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-425
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ; Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14
AmER. U.L. REV. 1 (1964).
71. Previous opinions dealt with the rule on the basis that "without it the con-
stitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere'form of words'." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968). Now the rule is classified
as a "remedy." See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
72. 414 U.S. at 340 n.1. While the Court does not decide questions not before it,
one might have expected a panel with any degree of commitment to the rule to have
at the least reaffirmed its use at trial.
73. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
74. See, e.g., Spiotto, supra note 17 at 276-77; Oaks, supra note 15 at 706-09.
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